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Abstract
This paper examines lobbying and corruption as alternative ways of dealing
with regulatory obstacles. I propose a model where firms facing a costly regulation
can bribe a rule-enforcing bureaucrat to get around it, lobby the government to
reduce its impact, or do both. I then use a firm-level dataset of Eastern European
enterprises to examine whether firms use membership in a lobby group as a substi-
tute for the bribe payments they make to rule-enforcing bureaucrats. The results
indicate that firms who join lobby groups do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats,
and firms more impacted by corruption are no more likely to join a lobby group
than their counterparts. On the other hand joining a lobby group increases the
likelihood of a firm bribing legislators and other rule makers, suggesting that lob-
bying introduces the possibility of state capture by allowing firms access to policy
makers that they wouldn’t otherwise have.
∗Eugene Kiselev is currently a PhD student at Brandeis University International Business School.
e-mail: ekiselev@brandeis.edu.
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1 Introduction
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, firms in many post-Soviet countries have been in
an ongoing battle against corruption and government interference while operating in an
environment of excessive regulation and legal uncertainty. Still the business environment
in these countries continues to mature, and a potentially promising development has
been the emergence of business associations. These groups provide a number of services
to firms, including dispute resolution mechanisms, domestic and international product
market information, help with licensing, and perhaps most importantly the lobbying of
local and federal governments to achieve outcomes favorable to association members.
Recent literature has explored whether lobbying efforts by business associations can
eventually replace bribe payments to bureaucrats. Researchers argue that at the country-
level, lobbying should eventually overtake corruption as a mechanism for achieving out-
comes in the private sector as economies grow and political and legal institutions develop.
A similar argument has been put forward at the firm level, suggesting that as enterprises
grow they will forego bribing rule-enforcers (bureaucrats) in favor of lobbying rulemakers;
the logic being that the need to bribe bureaucrats to get around complex and unfavorable
regulations will disappear once lobbying efforts succeed in making these regulations more
firm-friendly. While this outcome appears plausible, as yet there have been no empirical
studies attempting to establish a strong causal link between bureaucratic corruption and
lobbying by business associations. In addition, while recent studies have examined the
relative impact of lobbying and bureaucratic corruption on firm outcomes such as sales
growth and political influence, researchers have yet to investigate political corruption
and whether business associations play a role in state capture through private payments
directed at policy makers.
This paper investigates the relationship between lobbying and corruption by first
proposing a simple model of a firm dealing with costly government regulations. The
model examines the conditions under which the firm will choose to bribe or lobby to
deal with the regulations, and offers testable predictions. The empirical analysis begins
by examining whether the determinants of bribe payments and lobby group membership
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in the former Soviet Union are in fact the ones suggested by the model, and then asks
whether bribe payments to bureaucrats have any direct bearing on the decision to join a
lobby group. As lobbying is not the sole function of a business association, the analysis
also looks at the other services that associations provide in order to determine whether
different firms derive different benefits from membership. Finally I ask whether joining
a lobby group leads to political corruption by investigating whether firms use business
associations to gain access to and bribe rulemakers and other high-level officials.
Utilizing the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
conducted by the World Bank in 2002 and 2005, I first examine the firm-level deter-
minants of lobby group membership and corruption. Firms that are more harmed by
government regulations pay larger bribes and pay bribes more frequently, and are also
more likely to be members of business associations. When dealing with regulations the
bargaining power of a firm is very important; firms with less bargaining power pay bribes
more frequently and are more likely to be association members. Finally the BEEPS data
contains nearly 1500 firms that were interviewed in 2002 and again in 2005. I use the
panel structure of the data to show that paying bribes does not affect the subsequent
decision to join an association, nor does joining an association result in lower bribe
payments to rule-enforcing bureaucrats.
Turning the focus to political corruption I find that joining a business association
increases the likelihood of a firm making bribe payments to legislators to bring about
regulatory change. In other words, not only do association members continue paying
bribes to rule-enforcing bureaucrats but they are also more inclined to influence leg-
islation through bribe payments to rulemakers. However not all business association
members are equally likely to engage in political corruption. Firms that value the lob-
bying and dispute resolution services provided by associations are in fact more likely to
bribe legislators, but other firms more concerned with accrediting standards or domestic
and international product market information are not. I conclude that business associa-
tions serve a multitude of functions, many of which are unrelated to political corruption.
However they can also act as a gateway to accessing and bribing rulemakers for firms
that lobby the government or are involved in regulatory disputes.
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The analysis concludes that both regulatory conditions and firm-level characteristics
influence decisions regarding bribery and lobby group membership. Though firms do not
join business associations simply to avoid paying bribes, the conditions underpinning
both decisions are certainly interrelated. Furthermore some firms take advantage of the
access to public officials granted by business associations and bribe legislators to affect
favorable outcomes. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on
business associations and lobby groups in Europe and elsewhere and discusses relevant
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 proposes a simple model of lobbying and
corruption. Section 4 presents the data, while section 5 discusses the empirical strategy
and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Business Associations and Lobby Groups: Theory
and Evidence
Many post-Soviet countries share a number of economic and regulatory problems that
require collective action on the part of private actors to facilitate change. These include
complicated and frequently changing legal codes, regulatory obstacles that increase the
costs of starting and operating businesses, few reliable dispute resolution mechanisms,
and of course bureaucratic corruption. The emergence of business associations in the late
1990’s and early 2000’s can be attributed to the desire of businesses to improve many of
these conditions. Country-specific case studies have shown that associations targeting
specific obstacles can have significant success in promoting efficiency and precipitating
regulatory change, including expediting business licensing and registration, providing
firms with legal services to combat predatory government practices, and even providing
governments with the necessary impetus to undertake large-scale endeavours such as
macroeconomic reform (Sullivan, 2007; Duvanova, 2006; Doner & Schneider, 2000). Em-
pirical analyses utilizing surveys of business associations and association members have
provided additional support for the positive influence of these organizations. Analyses
of Russian associations show that membership offers benefits such as dispute resolution,
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consulting, and other services, and that relative to non-members, members are quicker
to adopt new technologies, are more likely to import/export, and have higher levels of
investment (Pyle, 2005; Pyle, 2006).
The lobbying component of business associations cannot be overlooked, and the as-
sessment of lobby groups as rent-seeking organizations is a constant theme in the litera-
ture. Much of the theoretical research assumes lobbying is simply a transfer of resources
from one group to another, so that the distinction between lobbying and political cor-
ruption is nebulous at best. 1 Deliberate attempts to separate out the effects of lobbying
and corruption in a theoretical setting are relatively uncommon, but studies that have
done so draw the distinction on the basis of information provision to politicians vs. direct
contributions (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2001) or in the transfer cost differences of the
two activities (Begovic, 2005). A unique recharacterization of the distinction between
lobbying and corruption is presented by Harstad and Svensson, who define lobbying
as any activity (including a transfer of resources) that aims to change existing policy,
whereas corruption (in the form of bribery) is a tool to get around rules and regulations
(Harstad & Svensson, 2011). They model this relationship in the context of firms paying
bribes to avoid regulatory hurdles; bureaucrats cannot commit to not asking for higher
bribes in the future, and as bribes are rising in firms’ investment levels they find that
continuing to bribe rule enforcers becomes relatively less desirable than joining a lobby
group to change existing regulations. The result at the micro-level is that small firms
bribe whereas large firms lobby.
A small empirical literature has sprung up alongside the Harstad and Svensson model.
Utilizing the 2000 World Business Environment Survey, Bennedsen and Feldmann find
that large firms have more political influence relative to smaller ones. In addition they
perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes to “get things done” less fre-
quently. They also find benefits to political influence in the form of higher sales and more
government subsidies (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2009). Campos and Giovannoni make use
of the 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, and while find-
1See Grossman & Helpman (1994), Coate & Morris (1999), Yalcin & Damania (2005). Surveys of
the theoretical literature on lobbying include Grossman & Helpman (2002) and Austen-Smith (1997)
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ing no direct correlation between bureaucratic corruption and lobby membership their
analysis does conclude that large firms are associated with lobbying while small ones are
more likely to bribe. In addition they find that lobbying increases both political influence
and sales growth whereas corruption does not (Campos & Giovannoni, 2008). However
their study suffers from using association membership and lobbying interchangeably, as
they do not examine other association functions. They also do not distinguish between
bureaucratic and political corruption, and in doing so misrepresent their bribe payments
variable in the survey. The most recent study to examine the lobbying and corruption
relationship is by Sukiassyan and Nugent. They employ both the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS
surveys, as well as the panel of firms surveyed in both years. Exploring primarily firm
outcomes they find that association membership increases not only sales growth but
also growth in exports and R&D. Most importantly they discover that lobbying has the
smallest effect on firm outcomes, with other association benefits such as product market
information and accreditation standards being more salient. Like previous studies they
find that bribe payments do not affect firm performance (Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011).
In many of these empirical papers there are potential problems arising from asso-
ciation membership and bribe payments being endogenous to firm outcomes such as
political influence and growth. While the latest studies acknowledge these concerns,
they are nonetheless limited in their ability to convincingly show causality. This paper
contends with endogeneity concerns by making use of the panel structure of the data, ex-
amining business association membership dynamics and their effect on relevant outcome
variables. In addition I extend the literature in multiple directions, both by proposing a
new theoretical framework to study the relationship between lobbying and bureaucratic
corruption, and by examining the link between lobby group membership and political
corruption.
3 Two-Period Model of Corruption & Lobbying
I propose a simple two-period model to explore a firm’s options in dealing with costly
government regulations, the results of which will be further explored in the empirical
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analysis. A firm faces regulations that cost it c per unit of sales each period. The total
regulatory cost in a period is R = cS, where S is sales.2 A firm can either bribe a
rule-enforcing bureaucrat to get around the regulations, lobby the government to reduce
the regulatory burden, or do both. Firms choose the course of action that maximizes
the sum of their two period payoffs. The following section describes a firm’s actions and
payoffs in each period.
3.1 Strategies & Payoffs
3.1.1 Period 1
In the first period the firm faces a regulatory cost of R1 = cS1. It can either bribe a bu-
reaucrat to eliminate R1 entirely, lobby the government to reduce the cost of regulations
in the second period while still paying R1 in the current period, or lobby the government
and pay a bribe in the first period.3 The first period payoffs are as follows:
pi1bribe = S1 − b1 where b1 is the first period bribe payment to the bureaucrat
pi1lobby = S1 − L−R1 where L is the amount spent on lobbying efforts
pi1lobby+bribe = S1 − L− b1
If the firm chooses to bribe in the first period, it will negotiate the bribe amount with
the bureaucrat. It will never pay more than the cost of the regulation, R1. Similarly the
bureaucrat will not accept anything less than the expected risk of soliciting the bribe.
I assume the expected penalty to the bureaucrat is θαb, where θ is the probability of
being caught and α > 1 is the severity of the penalty as a function of the bribe amount
received. Therefore b ∈ [θαb, R1]. The value of b is determined in a Nash bargaining
2This can describe many types of regulations. Tax regulations are directly tied to a firm’s profitability.
Production licenses, environmental or labor regulations are a function of production and output and
therefore tied to sales as well. Though the per-unit cost of regulation is the same for firms of different
sizes, in this setup larger firms will pay more in total.
3I assume that lobbying efforts take one period to succeed in reducing the burden of regulation.
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framework assuming the bureaucrat has a relative bargaining power of β ∈ (0, 1). The
bribe amount is then determined through the following optimization problem:
max
b1
(b1 − θαb1)β(R1 − b1)(1−β)
I assume θα < 1 so the bureaucrat will always find it in their interest to negotiate
some bribe amount. Plugging R1 = cS1 into the above maximization problem and solving
for the optimal bribe, we have that b1 = βcS1. We can immediately see that lobbying
and bribing in the first period strictly dominates lobbying and paying the full cost of the
regulation. Whether lobbying and bribing dominates only bribing will depend on how
lobbying in period 1 affects regulations in period 2, which is what I turn to now.
3.1.2 Period 2
The firm has sales of S2 = (1 + g)S1, where g is the growth rate of the firm (and can be
negative). It again faces a regulation, R2. If the firm lobbied in the first period, the cost
of the regulation in period 2 is reduced based on the amount spent on lobbying.4 The
second period cost of regulation is defined as follows:
R2 = cS2(1− δL1+L)
Where δ ∈ (0, 1] represents the extent to which the regulatory environment can be
improved through lobbying.5 This setup assumes that there are decreasing returns to
lobbying, with each additional unit of L leading to a smaller reduction in R2.
In the second period the firm can either choose to pay R2 or again bribe a bureaucrat
to sidestep it. If it chooses to bribe, the bribe amount b2 is again determined through
Nash bargaining:6
max
b2
(b2 − θαb2)β(R2 − b2)(1−β)
4Lobbying effectiveness may also depend on other firms’ actions. Introducing an additional parameter
to represent other firms’ contributions to lobbying efforts does not affect the main results of the model.
As this feature of lobbying is not the primary focus of the model, it is not presented here.
5For example, δ = 0.5 indicates that even an infinite amount spent on lobbying can only cut the
regulatory cost in half. The intuition is that lobbying can improve the regulatory environment and be
less costly to firms, but some regulations will always exist.
6This form of the bargaining solution is also used in Harstad & Svensson (2011).
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Plugging in for R2 and solving, we have:
b2 = βcS1(1+g)(L−δL+1)1+L
To determine whether the firm chooses to pay the regulation or again bribe the
bureaucrat we need to compare b2 and R2. Some algebra reveals that bribing will alway
be preferable to paying R2 so long as L > β−1β(δ−1)+1 . This fraction is always negative given
the domain of β and δ. Therefore a firm will choose to bribe in period 2 irrespective of
its period 1 decision regarding L.
It is interesting to note that a lobby amount L > 0 will always reduce b2.7 This is
because lobbying reduces the period 2 regulatory burden on the firm, which then pushes
down the bribe it is willing to pay to avoid what is left of the regulation. However
lobbying can only impact the size of the bribe and not whether a firm chooses to pay
a bribe. Even when L = 0 we have that b2 = βcS1(1 + g), which is positive so long as
g > −1 (the firm is still operating). Likewise, lim
L→∞
βcS1(1+g)(L−δL+1)
1+L = βcS1(1+g)(1−δ),
indicating that even infinitely large lobbying efforts still lead to positive equilibrium b2
so long as g > −1 and δ < 1.8
3.2 Optimal Lobbying and Model Equilibrium
Given that bribing is a best response in both periods, we are left with two sets of
strategies: {bribe, bribe} (bribe in both periods) and {lobby+bribe, bribe} (both lobby
and bribe in the first period and bribe in the second period). To compare these two
strategies we must determine whether a firm can justify paying L in period 1 to reduce
the bribe payment it makes in period 2. The two-period payoffs for these strategies are
as follows:
pibribe,bribe = S1 − b1 + S2 − b2 = S1 − βcS1 + (1 + g)S1 − βcS1(1 + g)
pilobby+bribe,bribe = S1 − b1 − L+ S2 − b2 = S1 − βcS1 − L+ (1 + g)S1 − βcS1(1+g)(L−δL+1)1+L
7This can be seen from taking the derivative of b2: ∂b2∂L =
1−δ
1+L − L−δL+1(1+L)2 < 0 ∀ {L > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1]}
8Even at δ = 1, b2 only approaches 0 in the limit.
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The first step is to solve for the equilibrium L if the firm chooses to lobby:
max
L
pilobby+bribe,bribe = βcS1(1+g)δ(1+L)2 − 1→ L∗ =
√
βcS1(1 + g)δ − 1
Clearly lobbying is only an option if L∗ > 0. If the model parameters are such that
the optimal lobby amount is negative, a firm would simply not lobby and choose {bribe,
bribe}. Therefore
√
βcS1(1 + g)δ > 1 is a condition that must be met in order for a firm
to choose {lobby+bribe, bribe}. Holding other parameters constant, we see that larger
firms (in terms of sales or sales growth) are more likely to lobby than smaller ones, and
the amount they choose to spend on lobbying is also a function of their size.
As there are decreasing returns to lobbying, there is an upper bound value of L at
which lobbying is no longer justified. To complete the characterization of the equilibrium
it is necessary to check that L∗ < Lcutoff ∀ L > 0. First we find Lcutoff :
pilobby+bribe,bribe − pibribe,bribe = 0 → Lcutoff = βcS1(1 + g)δ − 1
Comparing L∗ and Lcutoff it is obvious that the equilibrium lobby amount will never
exceed the upper bound value. Therefore we can conclude that a firm will choose
{lobby+bribe, bribe} so long as L∗ > 0, and {bribe, bribe} otherwise.
3.3 Discussion
The model equilibrium provides a number of testable predictions. It first indicates that
lobbying is a function of the size of the firm. If a firm is too small in period 1, or if it
does not grow enough by period 2, then the benefit of lobbying will not justify the cost.
This is because of the assumption that the regulatory cost is a function of firm size, so
the proportional reduction in R2 as a result of lobbying will be significantly smaller if a
firm’s regulatory burden is low to begin with.
The second important result is that bribing a bureaucrat is always a best response.
Unlike Harstad & Svensson (2011), this model suggests that as a firm grows it does not
switch from bribing to lobbying but rather engages in both activities simultaneously.
This is a more intituitive outcome because lobbying can never completely eliminate all
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regulatory costs. Even in an effective and manageable regulatory environment, firms may
still choose to bribe rule enforcers to bypass certain expensive regulatory requirements.
The size of the bribe payment is determined by the total regulatory cost. Larger
firms are willing to pay more because the benefit of avoiding the regulation is greater.
However c, the per-unit cost of the regulation, can be thought of as the relative burden
under different regulatory regimes. Bribe payments are also increasing in c, indicating
that firms who find the regulatory environment to be a greater obstacle will be paying
larger bribes.
Finally there is an interesting interplay between bribing and lobbying. To the extent
that lobbying reduces a firm’s regulatory burden it will also reduce the bribe payment
that the firm is willing to make. Nevertheless, even when no lobbying occurs the firm will
still bribe (again bribing is always a best response). Similarly bribing does not directly
affect the decision to lobby. However no lobbying will occur when β is low because the
firm has enough bargaining power to pay a very small bribe, eliminating the need to
lobby. The model therefore suggests that bribing and lobbying only impact each other
indirectly, and can be used concurrently depending on the characteristics of the firm and
the regulatory environment.
4 Data
To analyze lobbying and corruption at the firm-level I utilize the 2002 and 2005 Busi-
ness Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the World
Bank and EBRD. Local organizations administered the survey in a number of Eastern
European and Central Asian countries through face-to-face interviews with firm represen-
tatives. The analysis uses both the full dataset, containing 16753 firm-level observations
across 26 countries, as well as a subset of the data containing only those firms who were
surveyed in both years, creating a two-period panel of 1446 firms for a total of 2892
observations. Table 1 presents the countries included in the survey and the associated
number of observations, while Table 2 describes the outcome and explanatory variables
relevant to the analysis.
The survey data contain two key sets of variables concerning corruption and lobby
group membership. Bureaucratic corruption data is encompassed in two variables:
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pay_bribe and log_total_bribe. The former is a binary variable that takes a value of
1 if a firm reports having paid a bribe to “get things done” with regard to customs,
licenses, or other services that bureaucrats provide, and 0 otherwise; the latter is the log
of the total bribe amount (in dollars) that the firm has paid in all interactions with the
bureaucracy.9 Data on pay_bribe is available for both survey years, but log_total_bribe
is only available for 2005.
Lobby group membership is determined by asking firms whether they are a member of
a business association. Association membership status is available for both survey years.
For the panel data a combination of 2002 and 2005 membership status allows for firms
to be segmented into groups with regard to membership in each period: in-in, in-out,
out-in, out-out. From this I derive two binary variables, join_association (out-in vs. out-
out) and leave_association (in-out vs. in-in), allowing me to analyze the characteristics
of firms that join or leave associations between survey years. These variables capture
the dynamics of membership and allow the empirical models to tackle some endogeneity
concerns by looking at the initial 2002 characteristics of firms that eventually join or
leave an association, and then examining the change in these characteristics by 2005.
While data on bribe payments deals only with bureaucratic corruption, some survey
questions provide sufficient information to gauge the firms’ involvement in higher-level
corruption such as unofficial payments to legislators to affect votes, payments to judges
to affect court decisions, and illegal contributions to political parties. It is this set
of variables that the analysis will utilize when examining whether business association
membership facilitates higher-level corruption by opening the door to a previously in-
accessible level of government. For this group of variables the question is asked in the
following way:
In many countries, firms are said to give unofficial, private payments or other
benefits to public officials to gain advantages in the drafting of laws, decrees, regula-
tions, and other binding government decisions. To what extent have the following
practices had a direct impact on your business: (a) Private payments or other
benefits to Parliamentarians to affect their votes (b) Private payments or other
9log_total_bribe is only defined for those firms that reported making positive bribe payments.
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benefits to Government officials to affect the content of government decrees (c)
Private payments or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions of court cases
(d) Illegal contributions to political parties and/or election campaigns to affect the
decisions of elected officials.
The responses are ordinal on a scale of 0-4 from no impact to decisive impact. Though
the survey makes a point of not directly ask firms their corruption activities with regard
to high-level officials, this is clearly the intention of the question. On average over
80% of respondents claimed that these practices had no direct impact on their business,
suggesting that most firms do not engage in political corruption.
A second set of variables deals with regulatory obstacles. The firm reports on a scale
of 0-4 how much of an obstacle different types of regulations are to daily operations
and growth. The obstacles include tax regulations, customs and trade regulations, labor
regulations, and license and permit acquisition. An additional variable asks firms to esti-
mate what percent of senior management’s time is spent dealing with the aforementioned
regulatory obstacles.
Firm characteristics are also relevant to the analysis. Though sales data is unavail-
able for 2002, I proxy for sales with firm employment. The 2005 pairwise correlation
between log(employment) and log(sales) is 0.8, indicating that employment is a suit-
able proxy. Other firm characteristics, including exporter, pct_foreign, new_product,
and pct_govt_owned, will measure different aspects of the bargaining power relationship
between bureaucrats and firms. Government ownership of the firm is particularly im-
portant in that it may indicate the existence of personal ties between the company and
the government. This may result in the firm having certain advantages when it comes
to dealing with regulations.
Finally, the majority of studies utilizing the BEEPS data have used business associa-
tion membership and lobbying interchangeably. However associations can serve multiple
functions and provide many benefits to members. The BEEPS survey asks firms to rate
the six association services described in Table 2 on a scale of 0 to 4 from being of no value
to the firm to being of critical value.10 Looking at the mean values of each category I find
10The categories are no value, minor value, moderate value, major value, and critical value
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that firms actually identify lobbying as one of the least important association functions.
Firms cite product market information, information on government regulations, and help
with certification and accreditation as the most valuable services provided to them.
Table 3 presents pairwise correlation coefficients for the main outcome and explana-
tory variables. For both survey years the correlation between paying bribes to bureau-
crats and being a member of a business association is extremely low. In fact, the 95%
confidence interval for this correlation includes 0 for both years, indicating that we cannot
reject that the true correlation between these variables is zero. A few other correlations
of note include the relatively large positive correlations between association membership,
age of the firm, number of employees, and export status. Paying bribes to bureaucrats is
negatively correlated with government ownership and positively correlated with involve-
ment in political corruption. In the following section I further explore the relationship
between government regulations, assocation membership and corruption.
5 Empirical Framework and Results
5.1 Regulations, Corruption, and Lobby Group Membership
I first test the theoretical model’s prediction that bribe payments are more prevalent
among firms that are most affected by government regulations. I use the full survey
dataset to estimate the effect of different types of regulations on both the prevalence and
magnitude of bribe payments:
P (Pay_Bribei,t = 1) = Φ(β Regulationsi,t + γxi,t + vi + wt)
Log_Total_Bribei,2005 = β Regulationsi,t + γxi,2005 + vi
The first model is a probit regression that examines the determinants of paying bribes,
while the second is a linear regression that looks at the magnitude of bribe payments in
2005.11 Regulationsi,t is the set of ordinal regulatory variables described in Table 2. They
enter the regressions both individually and together as covariates. xi,t is a vector of firm
11As previously mentioned, data on total bribe payments is only available for 2005.
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characteristics including regulations_pct_time, new_product, log_age, log_employees,
pct_govt_owned, pct_foreign, exporter and wdi_gdpc. vi is a vector of time-invariant
control variables including the industry and country in which the firm operates, while
wt is the year effect. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Models 1 through 4 of Table 4 indicate that firms more affected by each of the four
regulatory obstacles are more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats. When including them
all as covariates in model 5, I still find that all but the reported effect of labor regulations
are significantly associated with an increased likelihood of paying bribes. In addition,
firms that spend more time dealing with government regulations are also more likely to
pay bribes. Larger companies, as measured by employment, are less likely to bribe than
smaller ones. However the magnitude of the effect is economically insignificant, as a
doubling of the number of employees leads to a less than one percent reduction in the
probability to pay bribes in all model specifications. Note also that government owned
firms are less likely to pay bribes.
Table 5 looks at the magnitude of bribe payments. Here we see that burdensome
regulations not only increase the likelihood of paying bribes but also the size of the
payment. In addition we now have the expected positive sign on employment. The effect
of employment on the bribe amount is fairly substantial: a 10% increase in employment
is associated with a 7.5% increase in the size of the bribe. Finally, though government
ownership reduces the likelihood of paying a bribe it does not affect the size of the
payment if one is made. This suggests that government owned firms may be able to
secure certain services without going through the regular bureaucratic channels; however
when a bribe needs to be paid, even government ownership does not alter the bargaining
power relationship between bureaucrat and firm.
I now turn to the determinants of lobby group membership. Recall from the theo-
retical model that the decision to lobby is largely a function of the size of the firm. In
addition the model predicts that firms facing the most regulations will gain the most
benefit from lobbying. Finally lobbying becomes less useful if the firm can pay a cheap
enough bribe, which again depends on its bargaining power. To test these predictions I
estimate the following probit model:
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P (Firm_Associationi,t = 1) = Φ(γxi,t + vi + wt)
Since the theory suggests that bribing and lobbying will share many of the same
determinants, I employ most of the explanatory variables from the previous analysis.12
The results are presented in Table 6. Larger firms are more likely to be association mem-
bers, as are those that spend more time dealing with government regulations. Exporters,
foreign-owned firms, and firms that have recently introduced new products are also more
likely to be members. From Table 4 we see that these firms are also more likely to pay
bribes. It may be that they face additional regulations which increase their need to bribe,
or simply lack the bargaining power to avoid paying. Consequently they have more rea-
son than other firms to be lobby group members and attempt to improve the regulatory
environment. Finally government owned firms are less likely to be members. Earlier
we saw that these firms are also less likely to pay bribes. It is reasonable to conjecture
that these firms simply don’t face the same costly regulations as their counterparts in
the private sector. Without a significant regulatory burden, they need neither bribe nor
lobby.
5.2 Panel Analysis of Lobbying and Bribes
The previous analysis has tested the predictions of the theoretical model with regard to
the determinants of bribing and lobbying, albeit in a static setting. However the model
suggests that there are dynamics in this relationship, with period 1 actions affecting
period 2 outcomes. For example the amount of the bribe paid in period 2 may depend
on how effective period 1 lobbying efforts are at improving the regulatory environment.
Likewise lobbying is indirectly related to bribe payments through the bargaining power
of a firm. If a firm can negotiate a low enough bribe in period 1 then lobbying becomes
unnecessary.
Some of these relationships have been uncovered in the pooled regression models
presented in the previous section. However, by making use of the panel of firms that
12The full set of regulatory variables is not tested here, but I do include total time spent dealing with
regulations. However, when the other regulatory variables are included in the model they are positively
correlated with association membership (as we would expect).
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were interviewed in both 2002 and 2005 I can establish whether joining a lobby group
between survey periods affects a firm’s future decision to bribe, and whether a firm’s
initial exposure to bureaucratic corruption affects its subsequent decision to join a lobby
group. An analysis of the panel data can therefore examine some of the dynamics of
bribing and lobbying suggested by the results of the theoretical model, and can indicate
whether or not a direct causal link between corruption and lobbying actually exists.
5.2.1 Do Bribe Payments Affect the Decision to Lobby?
I first analyze the decision to join a lobby group between 2002 and 2005 as a function
of the bribes a firm pays to bureaucrats in the first period, controlling for other firm
characteristics. I again employ the probit model but define it as follows:
P (Join_Associationi = 1) = Φ(β Pay_Bribei,2002 + γxi,2002 + vi)
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a firm joins a lobby grouped between
2002 and 2005, and 0 if it remains a non-member. This limits the sample to only those
firms that were not members of lobby groups in 2002. The regression model determines
whether bribe-paying firms are more or less likely to join a business association, as well as
whether other firm characteristics affect the subsequent decision to join over the following
three years. Because of the short (two-period) panel this approach is preferred over a
fixed effects regression or a first-difference model that uses association membership status
as the dependent variable. Since the majority of variation in the data is cross-sectional
rather than across time, the “within” estimator of a fixed effects model is likely to
be inconsistent and parameter estimates from these models will have inflated standard
errors; conversely this approach does not suffer from those drawbacks. I present the
regression results in Table 7.
Here we see that the decision to join a lobby group is unaffected by whether or not
a firm pays bribes in 2002. We also see that larger firms are more likely to join between
survey years. Foreign firms are also more likely to join, again indicating that foreign
companies may face additional regulatory constraints vis-a-vis domestic companies and
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can benefit more from lobbying. The other bargaining power variables have lost signif-
icance as compared to the full-sample regression. This is very likely due to the panel
data having a considerably smaller sample size, though it is also possible that the de-
terminants of lobby group entry are not entirely the same as the characterstics of an
“average” member firm.
In sum the results of this regression suggest that even though lobbying and corruption
may be two means to the same end, the decision to lobby is not directly dependent on
whether or not a firm pays bribes. Of particular relevance to the analysis of this dataset
is that lobbying by business associations may be a quasi-public good, where efforts to
improve the regulatory environment can potentially impact all firms in an industry and
not just association members. Non-members might therefore benefit without having to
join a lobby group themselves, regardless of how frequently they pay bribes.
5.2.2 Does Lobby Group Membership Impact Future Bribes?
Though the decision to bribe does not affect the decision to join a lobby group, it is still
possible that lobbying can reduce the need to bribe. Again, the theoretical model predicts
that equilibrium bribes in period 2 are falling in lobbying efforts in period 1 because a
reduction in the regulatory burden will subsequently reduce the maximum bribe a firm
is willing to pay. I test this model prediction by determining whether joining a lobby
group after 2002 affects bribe payments in 2005. I look at both the probability of paying
a bribe as well as the total bribe amount paid:
P (Pay_Bribei,2005 = 1) = Φ(β1 Join_Associationi + β2 Pay_Bribei,2002 + γxi,2002 + vi)
Log_Total_Bribei,2005 = β Join_Associationi + γxi,2002 + vi
Both the probit and linear regression models look at the effect of joining an asso-
ciation on subsequent bribe payments, controlling for initial 2002 firm characteristics.
For the probit I include whether or not a firm paid a bribe in 2002 as an additional
control variable. I am unable to control for Log_Total_Bribe in 2002 because the data
is unavailable. The results are presented in Table 8.
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Neither the frequency nor magnitude of bribe payments in 2005 is significantly differ-
ent between firms that join lobby groups and those that remain non-members. Here the
predictions of the theoretical model do not hold up, yet this is not entirely surprising.
The theory predicts that lobbying will reduce future bribe payments to the extent that it
is successful in improving regulatory conditions. Some degree of success is guaranteed in
the model (albeit with reducing marginal returns to lobbying), but this may not be the
case in reality. Lobby groups may be unsuccessful in bringing about regulatory reform
thus necessitating larger bribe payments. In addition three years may be an insufficient
amount of time to improve conditions. Finally we must consider that some business as-
sociations simply lobby less than others and instead direct their efforts to the provision
of other services. This last point is the focus of the following section.
5.3 Services Provided by Business Associations
As in previous studies, this paper has thus far used lobbying interchangeably with asso-
ciation membership. However there are many other services that business associations
offer. As mentioned earlier the firms in the BEEPS data actually value lobbying to
a lesser degree than product market and regulatory information or accreditation and
licensing services. But do all firms seek the same benefits, or are certain firm charac-
teristics associated with one particular association function or another? This issue is
explored empirically using the six questions regarding the value of different association
services described in the data section. Using the full-sample survey data I estimate an
ordered probit model of the following form:
P (V aluei,t = j) = Φ(µj − γxi,t − vi − wt)− Φ(µj−1 − γxi,t − vi − wt)
V aluei,t is the vector of different association services that firms can rate. The prob-
ability of observing an ordinal response category j for a particular service is a function
of the underlying latent continuous variable V alue∗i,t, itself a function of the regressors,
being within empirically determined threshold values µj and µj−1. xi,t is again the vector
of explanatory variables used in the previous analyses, but with one important addition:
impact_bribe_legislators, the measure of a firm’s involvement in political corruption, is
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now included as a covariate. vi is again the vector of fixed effects and wt is the year
effect. The results are presented in Table 9.
As expected all firms do not value every association service equally. Firms burdened
by customs and trade regulations value multiple services, however they value interna-
tional product market information to a significantly greater degree than the rest. Simi-
larly dealing with labor regulations is associated with valuing informational services on
government regulations, while licensing and permit problems are associated with valuing
dispute resolution mechanisms. Firms recently introducing new products appear to value
every single association service, as do larger firms. However in the case of company size
the parameter estimate is biggest with regard to lobbying services, supporting previous
results that large firms do in fact lobby more frequently. Foreign firms value lobbying
services while exporters are concerned with international product market information
and accreditation standards.
Of particular interest is that impact_bribe_legislators is positively and significantly
associated with every association service. That is, firms engaging in political corruption
appear to be interested in all of the services a business association offers. However the
magnitude of the parameter estimate in the lobbying and dispute resolution models is
much larger than for any other association service, suggesting that political corruption
is most closely linked to these two functions. This result implies a close relationship
between lobbying and political corruption within the framework of business association
membership, and will be further examined in the next section.
5.4 Do Business Associations Facilitate Political Corruption?
The distinction between lobbying and political corruption has always been tenuous. In
both the Harstad and Svensson framework and the model presented here, lobbying is
defined as a lump-sum transfer from the firm to the government without much thought
as to where the money is going. In the United States rules have been put in place to
ensure the legality and legitimacy of lobbying activities, however the same can hardly
be said of lobbying in other countries. Lobbying regulations in the European Union are
more concerned with granting access to policy makers than they are with transparency,
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and amount to little more than a system of voluntary registration and guidelines for
conduct (Lehmann & Bosche, 2003; Holman & Luneburg, 2012). In Eastern Europe few
countries have lobbying regulations of any kind, though recent scandals have created the
impetus for enacting new laws, as was the case in Hungary and Poland (Kalnins, 2011).
The question is then whether lobbying activities by business associations increase the
likelihood of bribe payments to legislators in order to receive favorable treatment.
5.4.1 Political Corruption After Joining an Association
This section will measure the effect of association membership on a firm’s involvement
in political corruption activities by determining whether firms that joined an association
between 2002 and 2005 became more impacted by bribe payments to legislators relative
to firms that remained non-members. As such the outcome variable of interest is Im-
pact_Bribe_Legislators in 2005. It is an ordinal variable from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates
that a firm is not impacted by bribes to legislators while 4 indicates that it is decisively
impacted. I estimate an ordered probit regression of the following form:
P (Impact_Bribe_Legislatorsi,2005 = j) =
Φ(µj − β1 Join_Associationi − β2Impact_Bribe_Legislatorsi,2002 − γxi,2002 − vi)−
Φ(µj−1 − β1 Join_Associationi − β2Impact_Bribe_Legislatorsi,2002 − γxi,2002 − vi)
The main explanatory variable is Join_Association and the model controls for the
2002 impact of bribing legislators as well additional 2002 firm characteristics and fixed
effects. Table 10 presents these results. The regression results indicate that firms who
joined an association between 2002 and 2005 are signifcantly more likely to see an increase
in their political corruption activities relative to those that remained non-members. In
addition firms that were already bribing legislators in 2002 are are likely to continue to
do so in 2005. That I observe significance while controlling for the initial corruption score
and other firm characteristics indicates that the increase in political corruption activities
is in fact the result of joining an association. But is it in fact the lobbying efforts of
these associations that makes bribing legislators so appealing, or do associations exert a
corrupting influence on all members regardless of whether they value lobbying or not?
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5.4.2 Political Corruption and Association Services
When looking at the services provided by business associations the results suggested
that political corruption was most strongly associated with lobbying and dispute reso-
lution. To more formally investigate this point I again use the full sample survey data
to estimate an ordered probit model similar to the one presented in section 5.3, but now
use Impact_Bribe_Legislators as the dependent variable and the association services as
regressors. The model is as follows:
P (Impact_Bribe_Legislatorsi,t = j) =
Φ(µj − β V aluei,t − γxi,t − vi − wt)− Φ(µj−1 − β V aluei,t − γxi,t − vi − wt)
V aluei,t is again the vector of association services. These services enter the model
both individually and collectively creating multiple model specifications. The results
are presented in Table 11, and indicate that while multiple association services are pos-
itively correlated with an increased impact of bribing legislators, when including them
as covariates (specification (7) in the table) only lobbying and dispute resolution remain
significant.
The association services variables are highly correlated, which suggests that multi-
collinearity may be causing a reduction in their statistical significance when they enter
the model as covariates. However even individually we see that lobbying and dispute
resolution have the strongest correlation with bribing legislators based on the size of
the parameter estimates alone. As interpreting the magnitude of an effect is difficult by
simply looking at an ordered probit regression table, I also present the predicted proba-
bilities of different levels of Impact_Bribe_Legislators at different valuations of lobbying
and dispute resolution.
What is most apparent is that, of the services provided by business associations,
lobbying and dispute resolution are clearly the two areas where political corruption can
play the most significant role. Firms can either bribe legislators to affect favorable
regulatory change or other lawmakers to gain an upper hand in disputes with regulators
and competing companies.
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6 Conclusion
Corruption and lobbying are frequently two means to the same end, and previous studies
have documented the relative success of each approach. This paper examines when
and why firms choose either strategy, and how the two are related in contending with
government regulations. I propose a model where regulations can be overcome by either
bribing a bureaucrat responsible for their implementation or lobbying the government to
bring about regulatory reform. I show that paying bribes is always part of an optimal
strategy, and that the bribe amount is increasing in the cost of the regulation and
decreasing in the bargaining power of the firm. Whether a firm chooses to lobby in
addition to paying bribes depends on several factors. In particular, larger firms are
more likely to lobby than smaller ones because they benefit the most from regulatory
reform, while firms with the most bargaining power are able to pay a low enough bribe
to eliminate the need for lobbying altogether.
Using the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS dataset of Eastern European enterprises I test the
predictions of the theoretical model by analyzing the firm-level determinants of lobbying
and corruption. I find that both the magnitude and frequency of bribe payments to
bureaucrats is increasing in the regulatory burden a firm faces. In addition firms with
less bargaining power, such as exporters or foreign owned companies, are more likely to
pay bribes. These same firms are also more likely to be members of business associations,
which is consistent with the model prediction that lobbying becomes increasingly more
useful when firms have less bargaining power and face large regulatory costs. Finally I
find that large firms are in fact more likely than smaller ones to be members of business
associations.
Though lobbying and bribe payments depend on many of the same variables, I do
not find a direct causal link between the two activities. Examining a subset of firms that
were interviewed in both survey years I find that bribe paying firms are no more likely
to join a business association between 2002 and 2005 than firms that do not pay bribes;
likewise firms do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats after joining an association. As
suggested by the theory, the decision to engage in either activity appear to be more a
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result of regulatory constraints than anything else. It may be that successful lobbying
can improve regulations to the point where bribe payments fall in the future. That this
is not borne out in the data may suggest that lobbying efforts were unsuccessful between
2002 and 2005, or that these countries required more time to enact the appropriate
reforms.
Finally I find that firms joining business associations are more likely to bribe rule-
makers than those that remained non-members. Involvement in political corruption is
particularly related to how interested a firm is in association lobbying and dispute reso-
lution services. Since lobby groups grant access to politicians, it is not unreasonable to
think that some firms may take advantage of this opportunity and channel their bribes
to higher-level officials to either speed up the pace of regulatory reform or gain other
advantages. Likewise when firms are in a dispute with competitors or regulators, bribing
the right person may go a long way towards improving their situation.
Bribing and lobbying are two important weapons in a firm’s arsenal, and their use
is dependent on regulatory conditions and firm characteristics. We can only hope that
as conditions improve and countries grow, the firms in Eastern Europe will move away
from corruption and take greater advantage of the lobbying and other services offered
by business associations.
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Table 1: Countries in BEEPS Survey
Country NFull NPanel
Albania 374 130
Armenia 522 98
Azerbaijan 520 136
Belarus 575 92
Bulgaria 550 178
Croatia 423 122
Czech Republic 611 72
Estonia 389 138
Georgia 370 116
Hungary 374 118
Kazakhstan 860 120
Kyrgyzstan 835 80
Latvia 375 108
Lithuania 381 112
Macedonia 405 68
Moldova 524 64
Poland 1,475 156
Romania 855 128
Russia 1,107 82
Serbia 550 86
Slovakia 390 58
Slovenia 411 150
Tajikistan 376 36
Turkey 1,884 94
Ukraine 1,057 294
Uzbekistan 560 56
Total 16753 2892
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Table 4: Effect of Regulations on Likelihood of Paying Bribes to Bureaucrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tax_admin 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0732∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0124)
customs_trade 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0132)
labor 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0167
(0.0116) (0.0145)
license_permit 0.178∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0135)
regulations_pct_time 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00111) (0.00116) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00118)
new_product 0.165∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0252) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0259)
log_age -0.0388∗∗ -0.0343∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0300∗ -0.0228
(0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0179)
log_employees -0.0167∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗ -0.0293∗∗∗
(0.00851) (0.00880) (0.00850) (0.00858) (0.00900)
pct_govt_owned -0.00570∗∗∗ -0.00564∗∗∗ -0.00584∗∗∗ -0.00573∗∗∗ -0.00545∗∗∗
(0.000482) (0.000493) (0.000479) (0.000485) (0.000507)
pct_foreign -0.000455 -0.000940∗∗ -0.000462 -0.000565 -0.000682
(0.000443) (0.000450) (0.000442) (0.000447) (0.000461)
exporter 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.0449 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗ 0.0699∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0324) (0.0314) (0.0318) (0.0332)
wdi_gdpc 0.0000260 0.0000265 0.0000213 0.0000364 0.0000313
(0.0000307) (0.0000317) (0.0000308) (0.0000309) (0.0000325)
year_2005 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗
(0.0566) (0.0585) (0.0569) (0.0571) (0.0600)
constant 0.0528 0.101 0.245 0.0596 -0.0773
(0.182) (0.187) (0.182) (0.183) (0.192)
Industry Dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14301 13334 14298 14146 12893
R2 0.1039 0.1028 0.0987 0.1086 0.1150
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10 , ∗∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5: Effect of Regulations on Magnitude of Bribe Payments to Bureaucrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tax_admin 0.141∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0424)
customs_trade 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0298
(0.0336) (0.0399)
labor 0.124∗∗∗ 0.0863∗
(0.0355) (0.0453)
license_permit 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0518
(0.0328) (0.0421)
regulations_pct_time 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗
(0.00324) (0.00340) (0.00328) (0.00326) (0.00341)
new_product 0.112 0.112 0.115∗ 0.133∗ 0.108
(0.0695) (0.0724) (0.0696) (0.0701) (0.0737)
log_age -0.0880 -0.0763 -0.106∗ -0.0844 -0.0715
(0.0555) (0.0579) (0.0557) (0.0560) (0.0582)
log_employees 0.779∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0296) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0299)
pct_govt_owned 0.00184 0.00134 0.00163 0.00207 0.00181
(0.00158) (0.00169) (0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00170)
pct_foreign 0.00242∗ 0.00177 0.00225 0.00223 0.00235∗
(0.00138) (0.00140) (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00142)
exporter 0.200∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.194∗
(0.0949) (0.0976) (0.0949) (0.0958) (0.0993)
wdi_gdpc 0.000978∗∗∗ 0.000972∗∗∗ 0.000967∗∗∗ 0.000988∗∗∗ 0.000968∗∗∗
(0.0000606) (0.0000626) (0.0000618) (0.0000626) (0.0000639)
constant -6.141∗∗∗ -6.018∗∗∗ -5.899∗∗∗ -6.078∗∗∗ -6.221∗∗∗
(0.452) (0.462) (0.456) (0.470) (0.486)
Industry Dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2326 2145 2326 2295 2087
R2 0.744 0.745 0.744 0.746 0.745
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10 , ∗∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 6: Determinants of Lobby Group Membership
Firm_Association
regulations_pct_time 0.00813∗∗∗
(0.00112)
new_product 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0255)
log_age 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0183)
log_employees 0.211∗∗∗
(0.00915)
pct_govt_owned -0.00390∗∗∗
(0.000487)
pct_foreign 0.00214∗∗∗
(0.000456)
exporter 0.319∗∗∗
(0.0335)
wdi_gdpc -0.0000562∗
(0.0000306)
year_2005 0.0778
(0.0577)
constant -0.00534
(0.199)
Industry Dummies: Yes
Country Dummies: Yes
N 14712
R2 0.2382
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10 , ∗∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 7: Do Bribes Affect Lobby Group Membership?
Join_Association
2002.pay_bribe 0.156
(0.130)
2002.regulations_pct_time 0.00189
(0.00589)
2002.new_product 0.215
(0.139)
2002.log_age -0.00344
(0.101)
2002.log_employees 0.205∗∗∗
(0.0535)
2002.pct_govt_owned -0.000440
(0.00234)
2002.pct_foreign 0.00719∗∗∗
(0.00228)
2002.exporter 0.187
(0.199)
2002.wdi_gdpc 0.000310
(0.000214)
Constant -1.760∗
(0.990)
Industry FE: Yes
Country FE: Yes
N 714
R2 0.2045
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10 , ∗∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 10: Association Membership and Political Corruption
2005.Impact_Bribe_Legislators
join_association 0.414∗∗
(0.206)
2002.impact_bribe_legislators 0.301∗∗∗
(0.0749)
2002.regulations_pct_time 0.00203
(0.00765)
2002.new_product 0.0406
(0.175)
2002.log_age 0.0632
(0.122)
2002.log_employees 0.0321
(0.0627)
2002.pct_govt_owned -0.00491∗
(0.00267)
2002.pct_foreign -0.00441
(0.00369)
2002.exporter 0.275
(0.276)
2002.wdi_gdpc 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.000167)
Industry FE: Yes
Country FE: Yes
N 547
R2 0.1883
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10 , ∗∗ p < .05 , ∗∗∗ p < .01
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